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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-EFFECT

OF

RATE-FIXING AGREEMENTS

ON COMMISSION

To encourage new industry and afford additional fire protection, the Town of Arcadia agreed to join plaintiff water
company in petitioning the Louisiana Public Service Commission
for a rate increase. Plaintiff, in exchange, agreed to increase
its water capacity by constructing additional facilities.' The
petition was filed and the Commission granted the requested
2
increase conditioned upon completion of the new facilities.
The facilities were subsequently completed and the increased
rate increase, the town and the Commission appealed. The Suthe Commission reduced the increased rates to residents but
required plaintiff to charge private industry and the town for
3
the additional fire protection afforded by the improvements.
Arcadia protested, contending that the charges to the town
violated plaintiff's franchise obligation to provide Arcadia with
free water service for fire protection and other town services.
The Commission thereupon ordered free water service to Arcadia, prohibited any additional rate increase to private industry and maintained the previously reduced consumer rates.
1. Cook & Co. agreed to locate a plant in Arcadia if a sufficient water supply
were furnished. Since the present water facilities were inadequate, it became
apparent that additional facilities (mainly an overhead storage tank) had to be
constructed. It was estimated that the construction of the new storage tank
and other incidental facilities would cost the water company $116,000.00. The
water company determined that their annual revenues would have to be increased by $28,500.00 to meet the construction costs. Thus the Arcadia Board
of Aldermen passed a resolution empowering the mayor to petition the commission
jointly with the water company for a rate increase which would provide the
required additional revenue.
A secondary purpose for the enlarged water facilities was to improve the fire
protection for the town. The Fire Prevention and Rating Bureau recommended
that construction of a 250,000 gallon overhead storage tank was necessary in order
for Arcadia to have adequate fire protection.
2. The increased rates were applicable to residential consumers.
Private
industry was charged a nominal fee while the town was guaranteed free water
for fire protection and other town services.
3. At the hearing, it was shown that the charge for 6,000 gallons of water
per month before the rate increase was $2.90 and under the order the charge
was now $7.05 per month. The Commission indicated that it wanted a more
equitable distribution of the costs of the added facilities since the residential
consumer rates had benefited the town and private industry. As a result of the
hearing, an order was issued which reduced the cost of 6,000 gallons per month
to $4.95 for residential consumers. Also, the town was to be charged for its
water, and the rates for private industry were increased from $10.00 per month
for each ten-inch main to $200.00 per month.
[140]
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After plaintiff instituted the present suit to reinstate the original
rate increase and the town intervened in support of the latest
order, the Commission suspended the increased fire protection
charges on industry. The district court reinstated the original
rate increase, the town and the Commission appealed. The Su-

preme Court affirmed. Held, the Commission is not bound by
rate-fixing contracts between utility companies and municipalities; however, the Commission's orders reducing the agreedupon increases in water rates and causing the impairment of the

obligation of the contract are unreasonable. Louisiana Gas Serv.
Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 245 La. 1029, 162 So. 2d

555 (1964).
It is fundamental that a contract has the effect of law
between the contracting parties, may not be revoked unless by
mutual consent, and must be performed in good faith. 4 The
privilege to contract is subject to the valid exercise of the

state's police power, 5 which cannot be restricted by contract.6
This power, however, must be exercised for an end which is in

fact public, and the means must be reasonably adapted to the
accomplishment of that end and must not be arbitrary.

More-

over, it is well established that the rate fixing falls within
the ambit of the state's police power." Therefore, it is clear that
the Commission is not bound by private rate-fixing agreements between a municipality and a public utility company.9
One of the primary functions of the Commission is rate
regulation of public utilities. 10 The rates set by the Commission must be just and reasonable," and they are subject to
4. LA. CivrL CODE art. 1901 (1870).
5. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 15: "No ex-post facto law, nor any law impairing
the obligation of contracts, shall be passed; nor shall vested rights be divested,
unless for purposes of public utility, and for just and adequate compensation
previously paid." See, e.g., Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189
(1936) ; City of Alexandria v. Toness, 216 La. 923, 45 So.2d 79 (1950) ; State
ex rel. Porterie v. Walmsley, 183 La. 139, 162 So. 826 (1935).
6. LA. CONST. art. XIX, §18. See note 5 svpra. See also Note, 20 LA. L. Rv.
624 (1960).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. See, e.g., Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297
U.S. 189 (1936).
8. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 5. See, e.g., Baton Rouge Waterworks Co. v.
Louisiana Pub. Comm'n, 156 La. 539, 100 So. 710 (1924).
9. However, it is possible that a municipality may be delegated the responsibility
to fix rates compulsorily and by agreement. See Note, 20 LA. L. REv. 624 (1960).
10. LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 5.
11. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4: "The commission shall have and exercise all
necessary power and authority to supervise, govern, regulate and control . . .
and other public utilities in the State of Louisiana, and to fix reasonable and juat
and joint line rates ......
(Emphasis added.) See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Comm'n, 241 La. 687, 130 So. 2d 652 (1961).
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full review by the courts. 12 Determination of just and reasonable rates depends upon each particular situation, there being
no requirement of uniformity.13
The findings of the Commission must be accorded great weight and should not be
disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse
.4

1
of power.

In the instant case, the court classified the rate-fixing as an
indirect problem dependent upon whether the rate-fixing contract between plaintiff and the town had been breached or
impaired. After finding that the parties had entered into a
valid contract, the court admonished the Town of Arcadia for
urging a reduction of water rates manifestly contrary to the
town's agreement with plaintiff water company. 15 More significantly, the court stressed that the Commission was not
inhibited from acting in the public interest by the rate-fixing
contract between plaintiff and the town and was definitely not
bound by the contract. However, the court concluded with the
somewhat ambiguous statement that the Commission's orders
reducing the agreed-upon increase in rates and "causing the
violation of the obligation of contract was unreasonable and
is subject to reversal."'16 In concluding the Commission's orders
12. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5; LA. R.S. 45:1192 (1950). However, orders of
the Commission are accorded great weight and are not overruled on judicial review
unless they are arbitrary, unreasonable and reflect a clear abuse of power. See,
e.g., Louisiana Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 244
La. 909, 155 So.2d 15 (19G3) ;Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
240 La. 669, 124 So.2d 902 (1960).
13. Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923) : "What annual rate will constitute just
compensation depends upon many circumstances and must be determined by the
exercise of a fair and enlightened judgment, having regard to all relevant facts
A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low
by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and business
conditions generally." In LaSalle Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 245
La. 99, 157 So.2d 455 (1963), the court held that a return of 3.9% was sufficient under the circumstances. In Southwestern States Tel. Co. v. Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 244 La. 1, 150 So.2d 543 (1963), a 5.53% return was found.
14. See, e.g., Louisiana Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 244 La. 909, 155 So.2d 15 (1963); Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 La. 669, 124 So.2d 902 (1961).
15. The court declared that Arcadia "should not now be heard to urge the
matter of reduced rates, as such action is contrary to its contractual obligation."
245 La. at 1055, 162 So.2d at 564. It can be argued that the court was
unwarranted in its admonition of the town for, prior to the town's intervention
in the instant suit, the town had not urged reduction of the agreed-upon increased
consumer rates but had merely objected to the town being charged for fire
protection when its franchise guaranteed free water service for fire protection
and other town services. While the above argument may have been valid prior
to the town's appearance in the present case, it cannot be denied that the town
intervened on the Commission's side and adopted all the contentions of the
Commission, thus, in effect, urging reduction of the agreed-upon increased rates.
16. 245 La. at 1056, 162 So.2d at 564.
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were unreasonable, it is difficult to ascertain whether the court
gave great weight, some weight, or no weight to the consideration
that the orders prevented enforcement of the rate-fixing agreement. Since the court clearly asserted that the Commission
was not bound by the agreement before it declared that the
contractual obligation had been impaired by the orders, it is
suggested that no weight was given this consideration.
While the court stated that the instant case was not a true
rate case but one dealing with the impairment of the obligation
of contract, it is submitted that the case was decided on the
misuse of state police power in fixing unreasonable rates.
The court evidently concluded that the 'Commission was acting
within its granted powers in ordering modification of rates,
but that in this instance the police power was exercised unreasonably because it forced the water company to operate at
a loss.11 The language in the decision pertaining to impairment of the obligation of contract was unnecessary because the
court recognized that a contractual obligation is not a restraint
on the exercise of state police power. The result could have
been obtained by relying solely on rate regulation principles.
Further, it is conceivable that the language pertaining to the
impairment of the obligation of contract could lead to the
erroneous conclusion that municipal agreements on utility rates
can restrict the 'Commission's rate-fixing power. Manifestly,
such a conclusion is inconsistent with the well-settled principle
that the sole limitation on the Commission's rate-fixing power
is that it must be exercised in a just and reasonable manner.
Raleigh Newman

ADOPTION -

REQUIREMENT OF RECORDATION

A succession proceeding raised the issue of validity of an
adoption of a major by the deceased, where the act of adoption
had not been properly recorded prior to the death of the adoptor.
The parties had executed a notarial act in compliance with the
statutory provisions but failed to record the instrument im17. It is suggested that the actual basis for the decision was that the water
company needed $28,500.00 additional annual revenue to pay for the added facilities
and the Commission's actions caused it to operate at an annual deficit of
$13,500.00.

